The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Many Worlds or Many Words? by Tegmark, Max
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
97
09
03
2v
1 
 1
5 
Se
p 
19
97
THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS:
MANY WORLDS OR MANY WORDS?
Max Tegmark
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540; max@ias.edu
(September 15, 1997)
As cutting-edge experiments display ever more extreme forms of non-classical behavior, the pre-
vailing view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics appears to be gradually changing. A
(highly unscientific) poll taken at the 1997 UMBC quantum mechanics workshop gave the once all-
dominant Copenhagen interpretation less than half of the votes. The Many Worlds interpretation
(MWI) scored second, comfortably ahead of the Consistent Histories and Bohm interpretations.
It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
give identical cookbook prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-minded ex-
perimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the “shut-up-and-calculate interpretation”, typically
show little interest in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some untestable metaphys-
ical sense or merely the way we subjectively perceive a mathematically simpler world where the
Schro¨dinger equation describes everything — and that they are therefore becoming less bothered
by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion of words.
Common objections to the MWI are discussed. It is argued that when environment-induced deco-
herence is taken into account, the experimental predictions of the MWI are identical to those of the
Copenhagen interpretation except for an experiment involving a Byzantine form of “quantum sui-
cide”. This makes the choice between them purely a matter of taste, roughly equivalent to whether
one believes mathematical language or human language to be more fundamental.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the quantum mechanics workshop to which these
proceedings are dedicated, held in August 1997 at
UMBC, the participants were polled as to their preferred
interpretation of quantum mechanics. The results are
shown in Table 1.
Interpretation Votes
Copenhagen 13
Many Worlds 8
Bohm 4
Consistent Histories 4
Modified dynamics (GRW/DRM) 1
None of the above/undecided 18
Although the poll was highly informal and unscientific
(several people voted more than once, many abstained,
etc), it nonetheless indicated a rather striking shift in
opinion compared to the old days when the Copenhagen
interpretation reigned supreme. Perhaps most striking of
all is that the Many Worlds interpretation (MWI), pro-
posed by Everett in 1957 [1–3] but virtually unnoticed for
about a decade [4,5], has survived 25 years of fierce crit-
icism and occasional ridicule to become the number one
challenger to the leading orthodoxy, ahead of the Bohm
[6], Consistent Histories [7] and GRW [8] interpretations.
Why has this happened? The purpose of the present pa-
per is to briefly summarize the appeal of the MWI in
the light of recent experimental and theoretical progress,
and why much of the traditional criticism of it is being
brushed aside.
II. THE MWI: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT ISN’T
Much of the old criticism of the MWI was based on
confusion as to what it meant. Here we grant Everett the
final say in how the MWI is defined, since he did after
all invent it [1], and take it to consist of the following
postulate alone:
• EVERETT POSTULATE:
All isolated systems evolve according to the
Schro¨dinger equation ddt |ψ〉 = − ih¯H |ψ〉.
Although this postulate sounds rather innocent, it has
far-reaching implications:
1. Corollary 1: the entire Universe evolves according
to the Schro¨dinger equation, since it is by definition
an isolated system.
2. Corollary 2: there can be no definite outcome
of quantum measurements (wavefunction collapse),
since this would violate the Everett postulate.
Because of corollary 1, “universally valid quantum me-
chanics” is often used as a synonym for the MWI. What
is to be considered “classical” is therefore not specified
axiomatically (put in by hand) in the MWI — rather,
it can be derived from the Hamiltonian dynamics as de-
scribed in Section III B, by computing decoherence rates.
How does corollary 2 follow? Consider a measurement
of a spin 1/2 system (a silver atom, say) where the states
“up” and “down” along the z axis are denoted |↑〉 and |↓〉.
Assuming that the observer will get happy if she measures
spin up, we let | -¨ 〉, |⌣¨〉 and |⌢¨〉 denote the states of the
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observer before the measurement, after perceiving spin
up and after perceiving spin down, respectively. If the
measurement is to be described by a unitary Schro¨dinger
time evolution operator U = e−iHτ/h¯ applied to the total
system, then U must clearly satisfy
U |↑〉 ⊗ | -¨ 〉 = |↑〉 ⊗ |⌣¨〉 and U |↓〉 ⊗ | -¨ 〉 = |↓〉 ⊗ |⌢¨〉.
(1)
Therefore if the atom is originally in a superposition
α|↑〉+ β|↓〉, then the Everett postulate implies that the
state resulting after the observer has interacted with the
atom is
U(α|↑〉 + β|↓〉)⊗ | -¨ 〉 = α|↑〉 ⊗ |⌣¨〉+ β|↓〉 ⊗ |⌢¨〉. (2)
In other words, the outcome is not |↑〉⊗ |⌣¨〉 or |↓〉⊗ |⌢¨〉
with some probabilities, merely these two states in super-
position. Very few physicists have actually read Everett’s
book (printed in [2]), which has lead to a common mis-
conception that it contains a second postulate along the
following lines:
• What Everett does NOT postulate:
At certain magic instances, the the world undergoes
some sort of metaphysical “split” into two branches
that subsequently never interact.
This is not only a misrepresentation of the MWI, but
also inconsistent with the Everett postulate, since the
subsequent time evolution could in principle make the
two terms in equation (2) interfere. According to the
MWI, there is, was and always will be only one wavefunc-
tion, and only decoherence calculations, not postulates,
can tell us when it is a good approximation to treat two
terms as non-interacting.
III. COMMON CRITICISM OF THE MWI
A. “It doesn’t explain why we perceive randomness”
Everett’s brilliant insight was that the MWI does
explain why we perceive randomness even though the
Schro¨dinger equation itself is competely causal. To avoid
linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish be-
tween [9]
• the outside view of the world (the way a mathemat-
ical thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction),
and
• the inside view, the way it is perceived from the
subjective frog perspective of an observer in it.
|⌣¨〉 and |⌢¨〉 have by definition perceived two opposite
measurement outcomes from their inside views, but share
the same memory of being in the state | -¨ 〉 moments ear-
lier. Thus |⌢¨〉 describes an observer who remembers per-
forming a spin measurement and observing the definite
outcome |↓〉. Suppose she measures the z-spin of n in-
dependent atoms that all have spin up in the x-direction
initially, i.e., α = β = 1/
√
2. The final state correspond-
ing to equation (2) will then contain 2n terms of equal
weight, a typical term corresponding to a seemingly ran-
dom sequence of ups and downs, of the form
2−n/2|↓↓↑↓↑↑↑↓↓↑ · · ·〉 ⊗ |⌢¨⌢¨⌣¨⌢¨⌣¨⌣¨⌣¨⌢¨⌢¨⌣¨ · · ·〉.
(3)
Thus the perceived inside view of what happened accord-
ing to an observer described by a typical element of the
final superposition is a seemingly random sequence of ups
and downs, behaving as if generated though a random
process with probabilities p = α2 = β2 = 0.5 for each
outcome. This can be made more formal if we replace
“⌢¨” by “0”, replace “⌣¨” by “1”, and place a decimal
point in front of it all. Then the above observer state
|⌢¨⌢¨⌣¨⌢¨⌣¨⌣¨⌣¨⌢¨⌢¨⌣¨ · · ·〉 = |.0010111001...〉, and we
see that in the limit n → ∞, each observer state cor-
responds to a real number on the unit interval (writ-
ten in binary). According to Borel’s theorem on nor-
mal numbers [10,11], almost all (all except for a set of
Borel measure zero) real numbers between zero and one
have a fraction 0.5 of their decimals being “1”, so in the
same sense, almost all terms in our wavefunction describe
observers that have perceived the conventional quantum
probability rules to hold. It is in this sense that the MWI
predicts apparent randomness from the inside viewpoint
while maintaining strict causality from the outside view-
point.∗ For a clear and pedagogical generalization to the
general case with unequal probabilities, see [1,2].
B. “It doesn’t explain why we don’t perceive weird
superpositions”
That’s right! The Everett postulate doesn’t! Since the
state corresponding to a superposition of a pencil lying
in two macroscopically different positions on a table-top
is a perfectly permissible quantum state in the MWI,
why do we never perceive such states? Indeed, if we
were to balance a pencil exactly on its tip, it would by
symmetry fall down in a superposition of all directions
(a calculation shows that this takes about 30 seconds),
∗It is interesting to note that Borel’s 1909 theorem made a
strong impression on many mathematicians of the time, some
of whom had viewed the entire probability concept with a
certain suspicion, since they were now confronted with a the-
orem in the heart of classical mathematics which could be
reinterpreted in terms of probabilities [11]. Borel would un-
doubtedly have been interested to know that his work showed
the emergence of a probability-like concept “out of the blue”
not only in in mathematics, but in physics as well.
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thereby creating such a macrosuperposition state. The
inability to answer this question was originally a serious
weakness of the MWI, which can equivalently be phrased
as follows: why is the position representation so special?
Why do we perceive macroscopic objects in approximate
eigenstates of the position operator r and the momen-
tum operator p but never in approximate eigenstates of
other Hermitian operators such as r + p? The answer
to this important question was provided by the realiza-
tion that environment-induced decoherence rapidly de-
stroys macrosuperpositions as far as the inside view is
concerned, but this was explicitly pointed out only in
the 70’s [12] and 80’s [13], more than a decade after Ev-
erett’s original work. This elegant mechanism is now
well-understood and rather uncontroversial [14], and the
interested reader is referred to [15] and a recent book
on decoherence [16] for details. Essentially, the position
basis gets singled out by the dynamics because the field
equations of physics are local in this basis, not in any
other basis.
Historically, the collapse postulate was introduced to
suppress the off-diagonal density matrix elements ele-
ments corresponding to strange macrosuperpositions (cf.
[17]). However, many physicists have shared Gottfried’s
view that “the reduction [collapse] postulate is an ugly
scar on what would be beautiful theory if it could be
removed” [18], since it is not accompanied by any equa-
tion specifying when collapse occurs (when the Everett
postulate is violated). The subsequent discovery of de-
coherence provided precisely such an explicit mechanism
for suppression of off-diagonal elements, which is essen-
tially indistinguishable from the effect of a postulated
Copenhagen wavefunction collapse from an observational
(inside) point of view (e.g. [19]). Since this eliminates ar-
guably the main motivation for the collapse postulate, it
may be a principal reason for the increasing popularity
of the MWI.
C. “It’s too weird for me”
The reader must choose between two tenable but dia-
metrically opposite paradigms regarding physical reality
and the status of mathematics:
• PARADIGM 1: The outside view (the mathe-
matical structure) is physically real, and the inside
view and all the human language we use to describe
it is merely a useful approximation for describing
our subjective perceptions.
• PARADIGM 2: The subjectively perceived in-
side view is physically real, and the outside view
and all its mathematical language is merely a use-
ful approximation.
What is more basic — the inside view or the outside
view? What is more basic — human language or math-
ematical language? Note that in case 1, which might
be termed the Platonic paradigm, all of physics is ulti-
mately a mathematics problem, since an infinitely intel-
ligent mathematician given the equations of the Universe
could in principle compute the inside view, i.e., com-
pute what self-aware observers the Universe would con-
tain, what they would perceive, and what language they
would invent to describe their perceptions to one another.
Thus in the Platonic paradigm, the axioms of an ultimate
“Theory of Everything” would be purely mathematical
axioms, since axioms or postulates in English regarding
interpretation would be derivable and thus redundant.
In paradigm 2, on the other hand, there can never be a
“Theory of Everything”, since one is ultimately just ex-
plaining certain verbal statements by other verbal state-
ments — this is known as the infinite regress problem
(e.g., [20]).
The reader who prefers the Platonic paradigm should
find the MWI natural, whereas the reader leaning to-
wards paradigm 2 probably prefers the Copenhagen in-
terpretation. A person objecting that the MWI is
“too weird” is essentially saying that the inside and
outside views are extremely different, the latter being
“weird”, and therefore prefers paradigm 2. In the Pla-
tonic paradigm, there is of course no reason whatsoever
to expect the inside view to resemble the outside view, so
one expects the correct theory to seem weird. One rea-
son why theorists are becoming increasingly positive to
the MWI is probably that past theoretical breakthroughs
have shown that the outside view really is very different
from the inside view. For instance, a prevalent mod-
ern view of quantum field theory is (e.g., [21,22]) that
the standard model is merely an effective theory, a low-
energy limit of a yet to be discovered theory that is even
more removed from our cozy classical concepts (perhaps
involving superstrings in 26 dimensions, say). General
Relativity has already introduced quite a gap between
the outside view (fields obeying covariant partial differ-
ential equations on a 4-dimensional manifold) and the
inside view (where we always perceive spacetime as lo-
cally Minowski, and our perceptions depend not only on
where we are but also on how fast we are moving).
One reason why experimentalists are becoming increas-
ingly positive to the MWI is probably that they have re-
cently produced so many “weird” (but perfectly repeat-
able) experimental results (Bell inequality violations with
kilometer baselines [23], molecule interferometry [24],
vorticity quantization in a macroscopically large amount
of liquid Helium [25], etc.), and therefore simply accept
that the world is a weirder place than we thought it was
and get on with their calculations.
D. “Many words” objections
The questions addressed in Sections III A and III B
are in the author’s opinion quite profound, and were an-
swered thanks to the ingenuity of Everett and the dis-
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coverers of decoherence, respectively. However, there are
also a number of questions/objections that in the au-
thor’s opinion belong in the category “many words”, be-
ing issues of semantics rather than physics. When dis-
cussing the MWI, it is of course within the context of the
Platonic paradigm described above, paradigm 1, where
equations are ultimately more fundamental than words.
Since human language is merely something that certain
observers have invented to describe their subjective per-
ceptions, many words describe concepts that by neces-
sity are just useful approximations (cf. [26]). We know
that the classical concept of gas pressure is merely an
approximation that breaks down if we consider atomic
scales, and in the Platonic paradigm, we should not be
surprised if we find that other traditional concepts (e.g.,
that of physical probability, and indeed the entire notion
of a classical world) also turn out to be merely convenient
approximations.
As an example of a “many words” objection, let us
consider the rather subtle claim that the MWI does not
justify the use of the word “probability” [27]. When our
observer is described by the state | -¨ 〉 before measuring
her atom, there is no aspect of the measurement out-
come of which she has epistemological uncertainty (lack
of knowledge): she simply knows that with 100% cer-
tainty, she will end up in a superposition of |⌣¨〉 and
|⌢¨〉. After the measurement, there is still no epistemo-
logical uncertainty, since both |⌣¨〉 and |⌢¨〉 know what
they have measured. For those who feel that the word
probability should only be used when there is true lack
of knowledge, probabilities can readily be introduced by
performing the experiment while the observer is sleep-
ing, and placing her bed in one of two identical rooms
depending on the outcome [28]. On awakening, the ob-
server described by either of the two states in the super-
position can thus say that she is in the first room with
50% probability in the sense that she has lack of knowl-
edge as to where she is. If there were 2n identical rooms
and n measurements dictated the room number in bi-
nary, then the observers in the final superposition could
compute probabilities for observing specific numbers of
zeroes and ones in their room number. Moreover, these
could have been computed in advance of the experiment,
used as gambling odds, etc., before the orthodox linguist
would allow us to call them probabilities, which is why
they are a useful concept regardless of what we call them.
Let us also consider a paper entitled “Against Many-
Worlds Interpretations” by Kent [29,30]. Although most
of its claims were subsequently shown to result from mis-
conceptions [31] (as to the definition of the MWI, as to
the mathematical distinction between “measure” [of a
subset] and “norm” [of a vector], etc.), it also contained
a number of objections in the “many words” category.
In Section II.A, the author states that “one needs to de-
fine [...] the preferred basis [...] by an axiom.” Accord-
ing to what preconceived notion is this necessary, since
decoherence can determine the preferred basis dynami-
cally? In the foreword to a 1997 version of this paper
[30], it is not only suggested that MWI adherents “repre-
sent a relatively small minority” and “tend to be working
in other areas of physics” (both in apparent contradiction
to the above-mentioned poll), but also that they “tend to
have non-standard views on the nature of scientific the-
ories”. In our terminology, this “objection” presumable
reflects the obvious fact that MWI adherents subscribe
to paradigm 1 rather than 2. Moreover, Galileo once held
“non-standard” views on the epicycle theory of planetary
motion.
A large number of other objections have been raised
against the MWI, tacitly based on some variant of
paradigm 2. The opinion of this author is that if
paradigm 1 is adopted, then there are no outstanding
problems with the MWI when decoherence is taken into
account (as discussed in e.g. [16,19,32]).
IV. IS THE MWI TESTABLE?
A. The “shut-up-and-calculate” recipe
When comparing the contenders in Table 1, it is im-
portant to distinguish between their experimental pre-
dictions and their philosophical interpretation. When
confronted with experimental questions, adherents of the
first four will all agree on the following cookbook pre-
scription for how to compute the right answer, which we
will term the “shut-up-and-calculate”† recipe:
Use the Schro¨dinger equation in all your cal-
culations. To compute the probability for
what you personally will perceive in the end,
simply convert to probabilities in the tradi-
tional way at the instant when you become
mentally aware of the outcome. In practice,
you can convert to probabilities much earlier,
as soon as the superposition becomes “macro-
scopic”, and you can determine when this oc-
curs by a standard decoherence calculation.
The fifth contender (a dynamical reduction mechanism
such as that proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini & Weber) is
the only one in the table to prescribe a different calcu-
lational recipe, since it modifies the Heisenberg equation
of motion ρ˙ = −i[H, ρ]/h¯ by adding an extra term [8].
B. Quantum suicide
The fact that the four most popular contenters in Ta-
ble 1 have given identical predictions for all experiments
performed so far probably explains why practical-minded
†The author is indebted to Anupam Garg for this phrase.
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physicists show so little interest in interpretational ques-
tions. Is there then any experiment that could distin-
guish between say the MWI and the Copenhagen in-
terpretation using currently available technology? (Cf.
[33,34].) The author can only think of one: a form of
quantum suicide in a spirit similar to so-called quantum
roulette. It requires quite a dedicated experimentalist,
since it is amounts to an iterated and faster version of
Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment [35] — with you as the cat.
The apparatus is a “quantum gun” which each time its
trigger is pulled measures the z-spin of a particle in the
state (|↑〉 + |↓〉)/√2. It is connected to a machine gun
that fires a single bullet if the result is “down” and merely
makes an audible click if the result is “up”. The details of
the trigger mechanism are irrelevant (an experiment with
photons and a half-silvered mirror would probably be
cheaper to implement) as long as the timescale between
the quantum bit generation and the actual firing is much
shorter than that characteristic of human perception, say
10−2 seconds. The experimenter first places a sand bag in
front of the gun and tells her assistant to pull the trigger
ten times. All contenders in Table 1 agree that the “shut-
up-and-calculate” prescription applies here, and predict
that she will hear a seemingly random sequence of shots
and duds such as “bang-click-bang-bang-bang-click-click-
bang-click-click.” She now instructs her assistant to pull
the trigger ten more times and places her head in front
of the gun barrel. This time the shut-up-and-calculate
recipe is inapplicable, since probabilities have no mean-
ing for an observer in the dead state |××⌢ 〉, and the con-
tenders will differ in their predictions. In interpretations
where there is an explicit non-unitary collapse, she will
be either dead or alive after the first trigger event, so she
should expect to perceive perhaps a click or two (if she
is moderately lucky), then “game over”, nothing at all.
In the MWI, on the other hand, the state after the first
trigger event is
U
1√
2
(
|↑〉+ |↓〉
)
⊗ | -¨ 〉 =
1√
2
(
|↑〉 ⊗ |⌣¨〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |××⌢ 〉
)
.
(4)
Since there is exactly one observer having perceptions
both before and after the trigger event, and since it oc-
curred too fast to notice, the MWI prediction is that | -¨ 〉
will hear “click” with 100% certainty. When her assis-
tant has completed his unenviable assignment, she will
have heard ten clicks, and concluded that collapse in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics are ruled out at a
confidence level of 1− 0.5n ≈ 99.9%. If she wants to rule
them out at “ten sigma”, she need merely increase n by
continuing the experiment a while longer. Occasionally,
to verify that the apparatus is working, she can move her
head away from the gun and suddenly hear it going off
intermittently. Note, however, that almost all terms in
the final superposition will have her assistant perceiving
that he has killed his boss.
Many physicists would undoubtedly rejoice if an om-
niscient genie appeared at their death bed, and as a re-
ward for life-long curiosity granted them the answer to
a physics question of their choice. But would they be
as happy if the genie forbade them from telling anybody
else? Perhaps the greatest irony of quantum mechanics
is that if the MWI is correct, then the situation is quite
analogous if once you feel ready to die, you repeatedly
attempt quantum suicide: you will experimentally con-
vince yourself that the MWI is correct, but you can never
convince anyone else!
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